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Abstract
Research in Artificial Intelligence has always had a very strong relationship with games and game-
playing, and especially with chess. Workers in AI have always denied that this interest was more than
purely accidental. Parlor games, they claimed, became a favorite topic of interest because they provided
the ideal test case for any simulation of intelligence. Chess is the Drosophila of AI, it was said, with
reference to the fruit-fly whose fast reproductive cycle made it into a favorite test bed for genetic theories
for almost a century. In this paper I will try to show Artificial Intelligence’s relationship to games is
quite different from what this analogy suggests. In fact, I will argue that AI is, at core, a theory of games
and a theory of subjectivity as game-playing.
1. Games, game-playing and game theory.
It is well-known that research in Artificial Intelligence has always had a very strong relationship with
games and game-playing. Much work in the field, especially in its founding years, has been devoted to
the development of programs capable of playing chess or checkers, programs smart enough to solve
puzzles, etc.1 Chess was a favorite topic, although it was not the only game to receive the researchers’
attention. Indeed, one of the brightest successes of early AI was a checkers playing program devised by
A. L. Samuel at the IBM Laboratories, while efforts went also into the development of programs capable
of solving cryptarithmetic puzzles, the Hanoi tower puzzle, and other “mathematical recreations.”2
Workers in AI have always denied that this interest was more than purely accidental. Parlor games,
they claimed, became a favorite topic of interest because they provided the ideal test case for any
simulation of intelligence: a game like chess, for example, can be described by just a handful of
rules and yet its complexity defies even the best human minds. However, since we usually take
good chess players to be very intelligent human beings in general, it follows that a program capable
of playing an acceptable game of chess should be considered as instantiating “intelligent behavior”
in general.3 Working on chess and other parlor games allowed AI researchers to leave aside
unessential complexities to focus on the relevant issues pertaining to human intelligence. This line
of defense is best summed up by an analogy that became very popular in the field: chess are the
Drosophila of AI, it was said, with reference to the fruit-fly whose fast reproductive cycle made it
into a favorite test bed for genetic theories for almost a century.4 As the validity and scope of
genetics is not limited to flies, so the scope and validity of Artificial Intelligence’s theories is not
limited to chess and, more generally, to games.
In this paper I will try to show Artificial Intelligence’s relationship to games is quite different from
what this analogy suggests. In fact, I will argue that AI is, at core, a theory of games and a theory
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/franchi.html[9/18/2009 5:07:54 PM]
of subjectivity as game-playing. This claim should not be interpreted in a reductive sense: I will not
be arguing that the theoretical constructs of AI are only applicable to games. Rather, I will try to
show, through a historical and conceptual reconstruction of the genesis of field, that AI came to its
basic insights by trying to answer a number of questions that were prompted by its continued
interest in chess: what is a game? what does it mean to play a game? Why can we take game-
playing as one of the most basic characteristics of human behavior?
Artificial Intelligence is a theory that identifies some of the most basic features of human
subjectivity with the basic procedures needed to play a game like chess, I will argue, and it could
come to such a conclusion only through a prolonged engagement with chess that produced, at the
same time, a theory of games, a theory of game-playing, and a theory of subjectivity as game-
playing.5
This interpretation will be established through a historical analysis of the genesis of Artificial
Intelligence’s interest in games and especially in chess. First, I will focus on the biological
counterpart of the analogy: the relationship between the fruit-fly and genetics. Then, I will show
that chess played a similar role in AI: its peculiar features allowed it to function as the catalyst of a
process that took off from the basic insights of von Neumann’s game theory and ended with the
production of a theory of games and a theory of subjectivity.
Two orders of reasons make this result quite interesting. The first is purely philosophical: in the last
few decades the concepts of game and play have often been used strategically as the pointers toward
a new conception of philosophy, an overturning of metaphysics, and other similar claims.6 Yet, a
direct engagement with games and game-playing is almost always missing in all these texts, beyond
the occasional passing reference to game theory or to Huizinga’s and Callois’s classic analysis. The
theory of games and game-playing provided by Artificial Intelligence is an important perhaps even
indispensable supplement to gain a better understanding of these claims. I will show, in other
words, that the analysis of games and game-playing behavior that could make more concrete so
many postmodernist and post-structuralist claims is to be found in Artificial Intelligence’s treatment
of the subject—and not, for example, in classical game theory . Although an explicit discussion and
evaluation of what AI says and what Lyotard and Derrida (for example) prescribe is left for another
occasion, I think it is important to prepare the ground by sharpening the identity of a candidate.
Even more so, in fact, if we consider that by offering a a game-based theory of subjectivity, AI
would indeed qualify as an example of a post-modern theory of subjectivity of the kind claimed for
by, for example, Lyotard. (and very much in the background of other apparently distant
theorizations, like Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism, that has nurtured so much French thought.)
The second reason is more methodological in character, although it has some serious philosophical
consequences. A detailed reconstruction of the conceptual genesis of Artificial Intelligence will that
the complex interaction between a scientific discipline’s tools, its object and its theories is never as
clear-cut as the traditional distinctions may suggest, in spite of what the scientists themselves may
claim. Thus, the immediate goal of this paper is to find out whether chess, and other games, just
happened to present favorable features allowing testing of AI programs or whether there has been
any kind of backward influence from the characteristics of chess to AI theories. In the latter case, of
course, the relevance of game for AI research would take a wholly different meaning, ascending
from the role of a classically interpreted instrument to a more substantially theoretical component.
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The effort does not entail that my analysis will rely upon a clear cut theoretical distinction between
tools and theories that has been extensively, and convincingly, challenged in the last 15 years. It
entails, however, that the distinction was (and still is, for the most part) clear-cut in the self-
perception of the involved scientists. It is precisely in this sense that AI researchers like Simon
wanted to exploit the Drosophila analogy: as a rhetorical weapon that, by demoting chess to the
role of a theoretically neutral tool chosen for its standard and objective features, saves the
seriousness of the theory used to explain chess-competence. Therefore, we are fully allowed to
assume a distinction that was internal to the field under investigation as a starting point toward a
more comprehensive analysis of the concepts, theories, and tools at work. In other words, the
distinction may prove to be as untenable as the works of Latour and Woolgar, Fujimura, and others
have shown. The exploration of the consequences of this fact in the specific case of AI is precisely
what is as stake in what follows.7
2. Drosophila in biology.
I will start by taking a closer look at the complex relationship between theory and experimental
tools involved in the Drosophila case, the bearer of the Artificial Intelligence’s analogy. Since AI’s
case, as I will argue, is even more epistemologically complicated, it will be useful to start from a
simpler occurrence of the same relationship. In a recent, comprehensive study, Robert Kohler argues
that the relationship between genetic theory and the experimental equipment used to advance it (e.g.
the fruit fly) has to be understood as a mutually reinforcing loop that acted in both directions.8 The
interaction between genetics and Drosophila can best be understood as a process represented by a
diagram (something Kohler does not use) of the following sort:
Three main components make up the picture: genetics, as a discipline with its theories,
practitioners, tools, etc.; Drosophila, as a living being with its biological, genetic, and social
features; and, most importantly, what Kohler calls the “breeder reactor,” namely the capability of
Drosophila plus genetics’ manipulations to turn out an ever increasing number of mutants. It is this
last element that, although made possible by other two, operates as the engine of the whole process
by propelling it back and forth between the two other components. In fact, the most characteristic
feature of the Drosophila/Genetics interaction is that there is more than one passage in each
direction: rather, it is a continuously operating, positive-feedback circle that alters substantially its
members each time it goes through a half-revolution. In other words, the relationship is a complex
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process that produces not only a theory (the genetic theory of the chromosome) as its outcome, but
also a new experimental object (the “standard” fly) as well as a new way of doing genetics (the
large scale, mass-production, quantitative experiments devised in the “fly room” at Columbia). But
let us proceed one step at the time.
The interaction started somewhat casually. At the beginning, as Kohler shows, the introduction of
Drosophila in Thomas Hunt Morgans’s laboratory at Columbia was quite casual, and most likely
not determined by theoretical reasons. Rather, it was the nice fit between Drosophila’s life-cycle
and robustness, on the one hand, and the growing need to provide hands-on laboratory experience to
unskilled undergraduate students living on a 9 months schedule, on the other, that was largely
responsible for the insect’s promotion in the lab.
Drosophila started to assume a more central role when Morgan himself started to work on
experimental evolution by trying to induce variations through intensive inbreeding and selection
among large populations of flies. For a while, the experiments were inconclusive, until some
mutants, among which was the famous white eye-color mutant, came up, rather unexpectedly, in the
summer of 1910. Two interesting events followed. First, when it became clear that the causes of the
mutations were to be found in scaled-up production and not in spontaneous, environment-induced
evolution, Morgan’s experimental work on Drosophila shifted substantially from experimental
evolution to hereditary genetics. What we see, in short, is how the unexpected results forced a
redirection of the theoretical interest in the scientist’s practice.
The second event is even more interesting. The appearance and complex mechanics of mutant
combinations (white, vermilion, peach eye-colors, etc.) was at first accounted for in terms of classic
neo-Mendelian formulas: that is, by postulating the existence of dominant and recessive traits in
particular genes, and by explaining the appearance of visible mutants by their combinations.
However, very soon the Drosophila colonies started to work all too well for the neo-Mendelian
paradigm. Unlike Gregor Mendel’s famous green/yellow peas or Cuénot’s brown/white/yellow
coated mice, Morgan’s fruit flies did not stabilize into a few diverse variations of the same
morphological element. New mutants continued to come up and each new eye-color (for example)
implied that the Mendelian formulas had to be rewritten. Since the formulas explained the visible
characters as an exhaustive combination of basic genes (later traits), each unexpected mutation sent
the geneticists back to the drawing board.9 This fact directed Morgan’s group away from neo-
Mendelian explanations toward a different, and more stable, theory of hereditary variation, e.g. the
theory of the gene, and toward the postulation of crossing-over and linkage mechanisms during
chromosome splitting. In turn, the shift from one theory to the other forced another change in
experimental work: neo-Mendelian searches for possible variations were abandoned in favor of the
tecnique of genetic mapping that permitted a more stable, quantitative account of mutations capable
of almost indefinite expansion.
This shift, however, forced a change in the relationship between the insect, the theorists’ and the
theory, that now affected directly the fruit fly. In order to obtain the precise quantitative mapping
that the new theory required, the Drosophila stocks had to be liberated from all the “genetic noise”
generated by other kinds of genes naturally occurring in wild fruit flies. As Kohler puts it, in order
to be turned into “a standard experimental instrument [...] every new type of genetic noise—lethals,
suppressors, modifiers—had to be identified and eliminated, one by one. Drosophila, so to speak,
10
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had to be debugged.”  The history of the interaction between genetic theory and Drosophila does
not stop here. Kohler shows, for example, how the standard form of the “constructed” insect that
was essential to the success of the precise, quantitative genetic mapping turned into a major liability
when scientists belonging to the fly group tried to expand their research in hereditary genetics
toward the genetics of development and evolution, where the relationship between environment and
naturally occurring variations became the focus of the analysis.
Four points should be retained from the biological analogy. First, there is more than one passage in
each direction, since the interaction itself is a complex process that is constantly retroacting upon
itself. Second, and perhaps more importantly, each passage substantially alters at least some relevant
aspects of one of the members of the relationship. For example, the “standard fly,” an animal
painstakingly constructed in the lab throughout a minute debugging of its genetic material, is a
different animal from the original fruit fly that entered it. Third, the engine propelling the
relationship to move back and forth is constituted by Drosophila’s unexpected capability to
generate an ever increasing number of mutants when undergoing the intense, large-scale inbreeding
and selection procedures devised by the scientists, what Kohler calls the Drosophila’s breeder-
reactor autocatalytic features. Last, but not least, the output of the whole process should not be
forgotten: the theory of the gene. In fact, the theory can best be understood as the object emerging,
at the epistemological level, out of the positive-feedback interaction between geneticists and
Drosophila that the insect’s fantastic (and induced) mutational capacities animated.
If Drosophila did indeed become the standard testbed of genetic theories for the best part of this
century, it is because the insect exhibited the right kind of complexity and the right kind of
simplicity: its genetic capabilities were daunting, as the ever new production of mutants clearly
showed. Its non-genetic features were extremely simple: its physiology was simple, it was easy to
breed the insect on a large scale, and it was possible to purify its genetic stock of all its inessential
complexity (the genetic “noise”). A biologist could not have asked for a better experimental setting
to test genetic theories.
But this felicitous mix of complexity and simplicity was not simply found in a pre-existing object.
In fact, two important features of Drosophila stand out. First, the simplicity of the animal was to a
large degree constructed by the experimenters themselves via a painstaking debugging that produced
a “standard fly”. Second, the complexity of the insect’s reproduction acted as the catalyst on the
whole scientific process and resulted in the production of at least three different kinds of objects: a
scientific theory —i.e the theory of the gene—, a new animal—the standard fly—, and a new way
of doing genetics—genetic mapping through mass inbreeding.
The similarities with the introduction of the study of chess into Artificial Intelligence, as we will
see in detail, are remarkable. What makes AI/chess’s case more complex, however, is that, at the
beginning of the process, the two terms of the relationship are far less stable than their
corresponding biological counterparts. At the dawn of the century, genetics was working along
some well stabilized lines: the Darwinian framework plus the great amount of work in heredity that
came out of the rediscovery of the Mendelian paradigm. The revolution the fly group started, in
other word, took place within a well-established tradition. On the contrary, the difficulties
intrinsically inherent in the definition of its topic made Artificial Intelligence far less stable than
genetics.11 Moreover, and as importantly, Artificial Intelligent was born at the same time as, and
12
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virtually because of, the interaction with chess.
Even more uncertain is the position of chess. In spite of all the changes it would undergo,
Drosophila, after all, entered the scientific arena with a well-understood ontological status and at a
well-defined epistemological level. No theoretical reasons set Drosophila apart from other living
beings. It was a living being, but not a “special” living being, like a virus, for example, whose
“borderline” zoological status may bias the experiments in a specific direction. Second, Drosophila
is inconspicuously simpler, or more convenient to study, than other beings. Whatever the
Drosophila does not have in terms of internal functional organization, or does have (reproductive
speed, for example) must be theoretically irrelevant, lest biological research wastes its time on a
simplistic case instead of focusing its energy on a methodologically simpler object. This second
point, in turn, entails that the “object” Drosophila must be sufficiently well understood, at least in
principle, in order to tear apart its “general biological characteristics” from its “particular
drosophiliac” features, so to speak.
Chess does not enjoy the advantages of its flying companion. Even if we restrict the topic of AI to
intelligent “behavior,” it is not so obvious that playing games is an exemplary case of it. Second, it
is not granted that chess is a relevant example of ludic activities in general.13 Even worse, a case
might be mounted that playing chess is a particularly extreme version of playing in general, making
therefore chess more like a “virus” than like a “Drosophila.” Thus, the task of pulling apart the
“generally cognitive” characteristics of chess from its “particularly ludic” ones becomes especially
thorny. Finally, once the proper understanding of chess is provided, it must be explained what
makes it simpler, and why the simplicity is not reductive. The effort focusing on chess as a relevant
example of intelligent behavior must start by defining a certain view on the game that selects some
relevant features and declares them as relevant, or by assuming which features of chess are relevant
and which are not.
Yet, the outcomes of the AI/chess process are at least as clean and polished as the theories and tools
produced by the biologist. This entails not only that the process is more elaborated, since the
distance traveled is greater. More importantly, it entails that the dynamic interaction between
Artificial Intelligence and chess produces theories that redefine substantially their very objects. If
the analogy between Drosophila in biology and chess in Artificial Intelligence is true, then it will
be possible to show that AI built the equivalent of the “standard fly.” It constructed a canonical
representation of games patterned on chess and made it into the standard case of problem-solving
activities. This canonical representation, in turn, left the AI laboratory to become natural once
again: it became the standard interpretation of games, problems, and problem solving. In other
words, the product of the process is as much a theory of thinking as it is a powerful
conceptualization of Artificial Intelligence and of chess, and (by extension) of games.
3. Games in game theory.
Let us examine how the interaction started. Games were brought onto the scientific limelight by
John von Neumann, who provided the basic framework for a mathematical concept of game and
proved some important mathematical results about solvability.14 Von Neumann, however, was
interested in a different use of games: he wanted to use them as the basis for a model providing a
basic mathematical understanding of the kind of behavior occurring in social interactions like
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economic transactions and strategic confrontations between social groups. Although he used
insights from actual gaming practices—especially from games with less than perfect information,
like poker—his work had little to do with psychology and individual cognitive capabilities.15 It was
instead a rather classical example of the applied mathematics he had been pursuing all his life: he
used mathematical techniques to turn a potentially useful but imprecise concept into a powerful
analytical tool.
Chess, it turns out, presents a rather uninteresting case for classical game theory, since it rather
easily proved that there is a strategy that assures White or Black of a minimal gain. like a draw. The
result was established by Zermelo in 1913 and states that chess has a value: there is a strategy such
that either White can always force a win or a draw or Black can always force a win or a draw.
Zermelo’s theorem is an existential result: it shows that there must be such a strategy, but it does
not provide the means to construct it. In fact, the complexity of the game makes it extremely
difficult to find such a strategy, so that chess is theoretically solvable, although, practically, still
unsolved.16 Rather, chess plays an important heuristic function, being one the favorite examples von
Neumann and Morgenstern use to illustrate their definitions of games in general. Since these
definitions will provide the framework for any conceptual understanding of chess in Artificial
Intelligence and beyond, it is important to review them, although briefly.
The basic concepts of game theory—game, play, move, strategy and solution— are defined by von
Neumann and Morgenstern in a single page of their work. The concept of game is rather
counterintuitive: they distinguish
between the abstract concept of a game and the individual plays of that game. The game
is simply the totality of the rules which describe it. Every particular instance at which the
game is played—in a particular way—from beginning to end, is a play. (49, their
italics.)
There are two important elements to underline. First, in everyday linguistic usage, “game” tends to
oscillates between a narrow meaning in which it denotes just the particular instance at which the
game is played—we might say, for example, “a game of chess”, “it was a life and death game,” etc.
—and, on the other hand, a broad meaning in which it denotes the whole complex range of
phenomena—the context, so to speak—within which the specific event takes place. Most often, it
is not easy to decide exactly how broad is the context picked out by “game” in the latter sense.
For example, the history of chess is not part of the game of chess to many casual chess players.
Any player who goes as far into the game as to read an introductory book of chess technique,
however, is immediately confronted with “internal” history even in the most technical contexts.
Openings, for example, are discussed according to their current viability, or their popularity in the
past. Even the basic concepts of the game are very often presented in a historical context. For
example, the sometimes subtle difference between attack and defense is often presented by
comparing the flamboyant style so popular a century ago with the elaborate, calculated defenses that
are now prevailing. Given that many chess players have reached this very elementary level of
sophistication, it is probably fair to say that the concept of “game” can be taken to be at least this
broad. Or consider the following comment, made by a journalist reporting on one of the final
matches of the 1996 world championship between Karpov and Kamsky while trying to explain how
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they came to a bizarre endgame:
A typical excessively hypermodern situation arose after 15… Nd8: there was no contact
between the warring armies and there was just one open file. It had the look of an
extravaganza by Richard Reti from the 1920’s.17
Thus, at one end of the spectrum we find the narrow concept most economically represented by the
score of a game published in a newspaper, or a book. Such a description is a game of chess in the
sense that it seems perfectly legitimate to call it that way. At the other end, we may have a
description as complex as that provided by the Japanese writer Kawabata for a very similar
intellectual pastime, the game of go.18 Kawabata—at the time a journalist—provides what
anthropologists would call a “thick” description of the Japanese go championship that encompasses
the whole gamut of experiences evoked by and enshrined into the event, from a technical analysis of
the game itself (with go scores, diagrams, and all), to the generational clash between the defendant
and the young challenger, to the different styles of play throughout the centuries, to the role of go
in Japan’s social and economic life. It is fair to say that one of the goals of the book is to describe,
through the magnifying lenses of a single event, the game of go.
The point here is not to decide which of the two meanings of “game” is more adequate, since both,
of course, are. The point is that von Neumann and Morgenstern’s definition does not fall anywhere
in the continuum spanned by the common uses of “game.”
Instead, they chose the narrow construal and went up one logical level. To say that “game” is the
“totality of the rules which describe it” means that a game is a set of abstract possibilities
describing the possible ways, in fact all the possible ways, in which the game can be played, if the
attention is focused on the rules only. To put it differently, game, as they define it, is an abstraction
from a concretely given event, that cannot correspond to any possible concrete event because it
belongs to a different logical level.
A second related point concerns the concept of rule. For von Neumann and Morgenstern,
the rules of game […] are absolute commands. If they are ever infringed then the whole
transaction by definition ceases to be the game described by those rules. (ib. , my
emphasis.)
As a first approximation, this is obviously true: any willful violation of the rules puts the player
outside the game and, in most occasions, effectively brings it to an end. If I were to start moving
my rook as a bishop, I would quite effectively be putting an end to the game of chess I might have
been playing, unless my opponent were to follow me and do the same. However, von Neumann and
Morgenstern do not directly allow this possibility. Since the game is just the rules that describe it,
and since the rules are absolute commands, it follows that any change in the rules will correspond
to a different game.
But this is seldom the case. Should we say that the game of chess before the universal adoption of
the rule governing the en passant capture by pawn is a totally different game, as the theory would
require, from the game of chess after the adoption of the rule? Even in the most formal,
“intellectual” games, many rules are the results of negotiations between the players, either at the
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/franchi.html[9/18/2009 5:07:54 PM]
individual or at the social level.19 Often, moreover, the negotiation involves the most basic rules of
the game, as anyone who has ever observed children playing simulation games will witness.20 In
game theory, instead, rules are essentially static and possess no latitude. Even more static, however,
are the definitions of move and strategy.
A move, quite intuitively, is
the occasion of a choice between various alternatives, to be made either by one of the
players or by some device subject to chance, under conditions precisely prescribed by the
rules of the games. (ib. )
Less intuitive is the crucial concept of strategy that is built on top of move. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern imagine that players may form a plan about their behavior in a game by deciding,
beforehand, which alternative they will choose for each set of alternatives presented by each move.
They call such a plan a strategy. As they observe,
if we require each player to start the game with a complete plan of this kind, i.e. with a
strategy, we by no means restrict his freedom of action. […] This is because the strategy
is supposed to specify every particular decision only as a function of just that particular
amount of actual information which would be available for this purpose in an actual play
(79, my emphasis).
What is peculiar about the definition of strategy, is that the concept of move, with its intrinsically
related temporal aspect, disappears, at least for any practical purpose. In fact, since a strategy has to
be formed before the player begins to play, and since a strategy is the conjunction of all the choices
that the player will make, it follows, trivially, that the whole course of action has to be planned
beforehand. This conception of strategy differs somewhat from the usual meaning of the term: it is
not a general rule of behavior that the player chooses at the beginning as a general maxim to guide
him through the actual mechanisms of the actual game, when it will be tailored to the specific
circumstances. Thus, “take control of the center” is considered to be a good strategic rule in chess,
but its concrete realization is not given in advance. Instead, the formulation of a game-theoretic
strategy requires that all possible games must have been plotted in advance in order to select the
advantageous from the disadvantageous behaviors. There is no game-theoretic strategy that
prescribes to “take control of the center;” rather, there is a set of strategies that describe the
sequence of moves that actually occupy the center. In other words, the concept of strategy is
intrinsically linked to the idea of game as a set including all possible games. It follows that, in order
to choose a strategy, all possible games must have been devised even if the player is to play a
single game. To put it differently, the games as described by von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s
theory are purely static, since the dynamic element of the interaction provided by the actual
exchange of moves has to be planned before the interaction starts.
The typical graphical representation of a game present in Game Theory and Economic Behavior will
make this point clear. Consider the children’s game of TicTacToe.21 It would be natural to try to
analyze this game by proceeding as follows: “let’s imagine the possible first moves by the first
player, then let’s imagine the possible countermoves by the second player, then let’s imagine the
possible counter-countermove by the first player, etc. A graphical representation of this procedure
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would bring us to a tree-like representation, in which each level stands for a move, in order to
capture the dynamic aspect:
The ovals, or nodes, represent possible configurations of the game, and the lines connecting them
stand for the action performed when a cross or naught is drawn. We can consider the initial position
of the game as the root of the tree, the first row as the possible first moves by the first player, the
second row as the possible countermoves by the second player, the third row as the possible
counter-counter-moves by the first player, etc.
Instead, the standard game-theoretic description is a matrix where each row represents one player’s
strategy (not move) and each column stands for the other’s, with each single cell representing the
final result. If we assume that the complete strategies for the first TicTacToe players are represented
by rows, the second player’s by columns, wins by W, losses by L, and draws by D, we may obtain
a representation like the following: (which represents only a fragment of the complete game):
The matrix representation is usually called the “normal” or “normalized” form of a game, as
opposed to the “extensive” form (e.g. the tree-like representation). Although von Neumann and
Morgenstern introduce the extensive representation of games at first (in TGEB), they quickly shift
to the normal form in an effort to simplify the formalism. In fact, the introduction of the concept of
strategy as a “complete plan of actions” by a rational player is what allows the reduction of a game
from the extensive to the normal form.
Notice that I am not accusing von Neumann and Morgenstern of having used a somehow “wrong”
22
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representation.  That would not only be silly, but also plainly wrong, from the point of view of
game theory. In fact, many of the sophisticated distinctions and concepts provided by the theory
(dominant strategy, zero-sum, equilibrium, etc.), are immediately evident when the game is
represented in normal form and are rather obscure in the extensive form. The point here is to show
the relationship between game-theory and chess (as an instance of a large class of games) and how
the former basic concepts make the latter quite irrelevant. In this context, moreover, the issue is not
that the matrix does not permit to express the complete game of chess; the tree-like one does not
either, since in both case we would have to do with immensely large objects. The point is that the
normalized form does not allow us to think about the complexity, since there are no moves in it,
only outcomes. In the case of games whose complexity lies along the temporal axis (e.g. the
moves), the game itself escapes the formalism.
We have now come to the last basic concept of the theory. A solution for a game is, intuitively, a
strategy that can maximize, for a player, his minimum guaranteed payoff: the payoff that a player
may won no matter what the opponent(s) strategy may be. The problem of game theory, then, is to
find if, for a given game, a solution exists. On the basis of the previous definitions, von Neumann
and Morgenstern are able to provide a taxonomy of games along different, independent,
dimensions: number of players, perfect or imperfect information (like most card-games),
cooperative vs. non-cooperative, zero-sum (one player’s loss is the other player’s win) and non-
zero-sum. For each class, they set to solve the problem of game theory. The simplest case turns out
to be the class of 2-person, zero-sum, perfect information game, whose best example is, yet again,
chess. For this class of games, the theory provides a theorem, sometimes called the Fundamental
theorem or the maximin theorem, that assures of the existence of a solution in any case.23
After this excursus on the basic concepts of game theory as presented by von Neumann and
Morgenstern in their 1944 work, let us go back to chess and examine how it moved out of game
theory’s concerns to become a central topic in Artificial Intelligence’s research.
First, it should be noted that from the strictly game-theoretical point of view chess is a quite
uninteresting if not altogether trivial example.24 In fact, chess is, essentially, no more complex than
TicTacToe. The only difference is that the greater complexity of the game translates into a bigger
matrix: more strategies are available to the players because there are more moves and because every
move offers more alternative choices. However, since any game-theoretic treatment of a game
requires the preliminary computation of the strategies, the complexity of chess escapes the theory.
To win (or at least not to lose) at chess is enough to calculate the outcome of every possible
strategy available to White and Black and then compute which one to use by means of the
“minimax” technique they describe.25 One of the first results of game theory (Zermelo’s theorem, in
fact) assures us that there is a strategy such as either Black can always force a win or a draw, or
White can always force a win or a draw. The theorem states that chess has a value (W, L, or D) but
the technique that would discover it is not applicable to chess, since it would require the
preliminary computation of the outcome of any possible chess game. As a consequence, chess
becomes only slightly more interesting than TicTacToe and in the context of game-theory serves, at
most, the same original purpose of Drosophila at Columbia: it is a convenient didactic tool that
may come handy since most students are already familiar with it, but is quite unfit for serious
theoretical work. It is interesting to see what Von Neumann and Morgenstern are perfectly aware of
the almost paradoxical status of chess within game theory as a solvable game with an unknowable
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solution, and it is interesting to see how they comment this interesting fact:
This shows that if the theory of chess were really fully known there would nothing left
to play.[...] But our proof, which guarantees the validity of one (and only one) of these
three alternatives, gives no practically usable methods to determine the true one. This
relative, human difficulty necessitates the use of those incomplete, heuristic methods of
playing which constitute “good” Chess.26
This brief quote substantially ends any discussion of chess in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
work. Game theory, at least as envisioned by its founders, has no room for this kind of human
limitation that may make game-playing difficult. Instead, it focuses on other, qualitatively different
kinds of complexities. Once they established the existence of a solution for the simplest class of
two-person zero-sum games (to which chess belongs), von Neumann and Morgenstern tried to
extend their analysis, first to multi-person games and then to non-zero-sum games.27 This program
brings game-theory farther and farther away from real games people play and into more and more
complicated examples of “games” that have little, if anything, in common with games as we know
them. In fact, the only link between “games” and the “theory of games” is provided by the general
definition illustrated above. An immediate consequence of the program is that any interest in
“empirical” games is lacking in game theory. A game like chess, therefore, lacks any interest for
game-theorists and, as a consequence, the game-theoretic community who set to work to expand
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s basic theory, in the 1950s, did not initiate any backward loop
toward a direct investigation of the game itself with the tools they had provided.28
The gap between the complexity of a concrete game of chess and the sophisticated machinery
provided by von Neumann and Morgenstern was so paradoxically big that it started to be used as an
objection against game-theory. Martin Shubik, for example, remembers that when he went to
Princeton to study economics and game theory with Morgenstern, immediately after the war, he
encountered considerable skepticism in the economics department. The standard objection raised by
the economists was: if “game theory could not even solve the game of chess, how could it be of use
in the study of economic life, which is considerably more complex than chess?”29 The game
theorists responded with what has now become the standard reply to be found in any textbook on
the subject; for example, Roger McCain writes:
Game theory may be about poker and baseball, but it is not about chess, and it is about
such serious interactions as market competition, arms races and environmental pollution.
But game theory addresses the serious interactions using the metaphor of a game: in
these serious interactions, as in games, the individual’s choice is essentially a choice of a
strategy, and the outcome of the interaction depends on the strategies chosen by each of
the participants. 30
It should be noted that both the economists’ and the game-theorists’ critiques converge on decreeing
the theoretical irrelevance of chess. For the former, the inability of game theory to solve the game is
a sure sign that the theory is totally off the mark: it has better focus on serious, concrete economic
facts instead of getting lost in analysis that cannot even come to terms with recreational activities.
Games should be abandoned altogether, chess first and foremost. For the latter, chess offers the
wrong kind of complexity, a complexity peculiar to the non-serious sphere, but the basic metaphor
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/franchi.html[9/18/2009 5:07:54 PM]
can be exported to the serious realm of strategic interaction, where it will prove its worthiness. On
both counts, however, chess is not to be taken seriously, and anyone working on them should be
prepared to defend his work against forthcoming criticism. Chess is off the loop of serious
theoretical work, to put it differently, and can serve, at most, as a didactic introduction to the basic
“metaphor” of the field to be offered in the first chapter of game-theory textbooks.31 Chess’s case is
certainly not unique in the field, and many other “real” games have endured the same
(mathematical) treatment: they are picked up as a source of intuition and then relegated to an
introductory, paradigmatic function. Poker, for example, has become the “standard” non-perfect
information game; “heads and tails” the standard example of the simplest example to require the use
of mixed strategies; more recently, the game of “Nim” has become the paradigmatic introduction to
combinatorial game theory. However, what is characteristic of, and perhaps unique to, chess, is that
it experienced a second scientific life. That life began immediately after the publication of Game
Theory and Economic Behavior and began, once again, with John von Neumann.
4. The Drosophila of AI.
Chess was brought back into the scientific limelight by von Neumann’s intellectual evolution and
his personal involvement with the RAND corporation in Santa Monica, a research institute heavily
funded by the military (specifically, the Air Force). RAND had been created in 1946 in order to
preserve in postwar years the intense collaboration among scientists that had proved so fruitful to
the national military interests during War World II.32 Santa Monica became one of the centers—
with Princeton and, on a lesser scale, Michigan— for the development of game-theory, and von
Neumann was immediately hired as a consultant. In the immediate postwar years, however, his own
interests started to shift toward the design and construction of electronic computers and,
consequently, toward the automatic resolutions of problems posed by, among other things, game-
theory. The possibility was far from being purely theoretical, since the combination of von
Neumann theory and military interests had brought about the construction of one of the first
computers at RAND, appropriately called (apparently against his protestations), the JOHNNIAC.
As a consequence of von Neumann’s shifting interests, chess (and games) were brought into the
orbit of computer science, or rather into the orbit of computers, while being understood within the
conceptual framework of game theory. It is in this context that he started lecturing on chess again,
every time emphasizing the immense complexity of the task ahead. Von Neumann, it should be
remarked, lectured on the difficulty of practically finding the “solution” of chess whose existence
was guaranteed by the fundamental minimax theorem. Therefore, he was not interested in a
chess-playing computer since he was trying to find chess-solving algorithms that a machine could
use.
The “optimizing” perspective of the theory, however, when combined with the complexity of the
game, made the task seem impossibly prohibitive, even on a fast computer. Moreover, the algorithm
designer could find no help in the study of the expertise of a good chess player, because there is no
direct link between the algorithm a computer will use and the way the game is actually played.
Humans can play chess well, sometimes exceedingly so—but they will never play it perfectly. A
game-theoretic computer, instead, is stuck in a paradox: it will either play a perfect game or an
exceedingly bad one.33 The two conceptual steps toward the solution of the paradox were taken, in
rapid succession, by Turing and Shannon and then by Simon and Newell in the early 1950s. It is
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their work that closes the circle and allows chess to become as productive for Artificial Intelligence
as Drosophila had been for genetics.
In a few years span, Alan Turing and Claude Shannon published two papers describing the basic
design principles that would allow a computer to play chess, although they never came to write the
actual programs. However, their use of the game is still outside Artificial Intelligence, broadly
construed: they want to prove, by demonstrating the practical possibility of a chess-playing
machine, that computers are able to manipulate symbols and not just number-crunchers perennially
devoted to solving differential equations as most people, at the time, took them to be. The quality
of the game played by a machine, its intelligence, so to speak, was thus less important than the
demonstration that such a machine could exist.34 To be more precise, a chess-playing machine
would perhaps demonstrate some intelligence, but the degree of intelligence would not be tied to
the quality of the game played.
Chess is still used in the “exemplary” mode as an instance of a more general paradigm, namely
symbolic thinking, which can be tested on the simpler domain provided by games. Chess may enter
the computer scene because the problem of “solving” the game, crucial to game theory, has been
put aside. “Playing” the game becomes the central concern, because being able to play an
intellectual game like chess is taken to be a significant test of cognitive abilities. Paradoxically, the
quality of the game being played is less important that the fact that a machine can “play” the way
humans are supposed to. Turing, for example, tested his design for a chess playing computer against
a person who had never played the game before and was taught the rules only a few hours earlier.
The experiment is significative and could not be farther away from game theory’s concerns. What is
tested is the program’s ability to follow the rules of chess, and perhaps pursue a goal, i.e. its ability
to think. It is not the performance level that counts, but the proof that a machine may think. Game
theory wanted to find solutions for the games of war and stock bargaining, and did not care if an
untrained human secretary (Turing’s test case) was or was not capable of understanding their
rules.35 In the passage from von Neumann to Shannon and Turing, instead, the emphasis shifts from
trying to solve the game to trying to understand the process that allows the player to play it (and
sometimes to win it).
It is remarkable how little of the conceptual apparatus of game theory needs to be abandoned in
order to pursue this new goal. The concept of solution has to be modified in order to find a new
conceptualization of “game” that would allow the theorist to find a winning strategy for the game of
chess (as von Neumann wanted), while allowing a computer to play the game (as Shannon and
Turing now desire). In fact, the definition of a different concept of solution is precisely one of the
first backward effects from chess to Artificial Intelligence, as we will see. Even more remarkable,
however, are the consequences of the approach that retains most of the theoretical framework while
redefining the concept of strategy. From a mathematical tool that strives to provide a computable
models of economic interactions, the redefined theory of games will transform itself into a sweeping
theory of that most cherished human feature—thinking. The first steps toward that goal were taken
by Claude Shannon, who was to be followed by and then by the three-some composed of Herbert
Simon, Allen Newell and Cliff Shaw, all of whom were working at RAND, either full-time or as
consultants, in 1950s.
In two short articles written in 1950, Claude Shannon entertains the possibility of a thinking
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machine, and focuses his attention explicitly on a computer playing chess. If such a machine
existed, he suggested, its behavior would probably be considered “by some psychologists” as a
thinking process. Shannon begins his discussion from a game theoretic description of chess in
extensive form, although his attention shifts quickly from the formal theoretic structure, the game,
to the agent of the playing process. The machine, he says, would first have to try out in the abstract
various possible solutions to a given problem (e.g. a move in the chess game), in order to evaluate
the results of these trials and then to carry out the chosen solution.36 The background of the article
is in place: the construction of a chess-playing machine is being examined in order to illuminate the
possibility of a thinking machine in general, i.e. a machine able to exhibit internal processes and
structures essentially similar to human cognitive processes. I stress this point because in order to
appreciate what Shannon is about to say on the internal structure of the machine we should not
forget that the implicit referent are the human cognitive processes, and the structures and algorithm
he presents are supposed to help either in a better understanding of the human mind or in an actual
reduplication of (parts of) it.
The basic problem, according to Shannon, can be split into three parts: (a) a translation system from
chess positions to sequence of numbers must be chosen, (b) a strategy must be found for choosing
the moves to be made, and (c) this strategy must be translated into a sequence of elementary
computer orders, i.e. a program (2126). The first and third problems are irrelevant for what interests
us here, concerned as they are with the problem of translating from human level to machine level.37
Shannon describes the basic problem of chess playing as follows:
A straightforward process must be found for calculating a reasonably good move for any
given chess position. (2127, my emphasis).
Although Shannon is thinking “the game of chess” in game-theoretic terms, he abandons in a single
gesture two deeply interrelated tenets of the theory. First, he shoves aside the concept of a
“solution” for the game of chess and proposes instead to find “reasonably good moves.” Second, he
abandons the game-theoretic and deeply static concept of strategy by focusing the attention, instead,
on moves. In other words, Shannon is proposing to shift the attention from the static matrix of a
game to the dynamic process that makes the game. This move allows him to see chess’s taunted
complexity in a totally new light. Or rather, it allows him to provide a framework to think such a
complexity. This last point becomes clear when we look at how he frames the solution for his point
(b) above:
The program designer can employ here the principles of correct play that have been
evolved by expert chess players. These empirical principles are a means of bringing some
order to the maze of possible variations of a chess game. Even the high speeds available
in electronic computers are helplessly inadequate to play perfect chess by calculating all
possible variations of a chess game. In a typical chess position there will be about 32
possible moves with 32 possible replies— already this creates 1024 possibilities. Most
chess games last 40 moves or more for each side. So the total number of possible
variations in an average game is about 10120. A machine calculating one variation each
millionth of a second would require over 1095 years to decide on its first move! Other
methods of attempting to play perfect chess seem equally impracticable; we resign
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ourselves, therefore, to having the machine play a reasonably skillful game, admitting
occasional moves that may not be the best. This, of course, is precisely what human
players do: no one plays a perfect game” (2127, my emphasis)38
Thus, the tree representing the complete extensive form of the game would have, as Shannon
reports, approximately 10120 nodes (80 half-moves with 32 possible choices = 3280 » 10120
different chessboard configurations). Set issues of size aside for a moment, however, and focus on
the structure.
The tree can be created one step (one node, that is) at the time by the recursive application of the
rules of the game. From any given position any legal move of one of the pieces on the chessboard
will produce a new position, and so on. The complete tree is of course impossible to create, but the
search procedure does not have to rely on a complete tree if it settles for less than optimal results. It
may create just a few positions per turn, deciding to explore only one or two moves beyond the
current one. Even this is not a simple task to accomplish, at any rate: if we consider an average of
thirty-two different possibilities moves from a standard chess position, the machine has to consider
322=1024 positions just for one move, 324 x or more than million for just two moves, etc. On the
other hand, a less-than-complete game theoretic matrix is useless, since it does allow the
specification of the strategies available to the players.
The second thing to notice is that the tree does not represent the “perfect” game, or indeed any
game, but the collection of all possible chess games, from the most trivial one to the grandmaster’s
masterpiece. In fact, every complete vertical path of the tree begins with the initial position and
terminates, after a variable number of moves, either with a victory for white or black or with a
draw, and as such stands for a complete game. The tree as a whole represents the space of “chess”
as such. Individual games can be recomprehended as proper parts of the complete structure (i.e. as
complete vertical paths.) The perfect game would become possible after the complete tree is in
place, since to play it is necessary to know the possible outcome of all possible moves, i.e. it is
necessary to read the tree from the bottom up. This is evident from a moment of reflection upon the
tree-like structure: White, for example, will know for sure if it can always force a win, only if it
examines every possible countermove by Black at any possible point in the game (i.e. at any level
in the tree). In other words, White has to examine every single node in the tree, before moving a
piece. This is why Shannon points out that the first move would take the machine 1095 years to
complete.
Since game-theory reasons in terms of “strategies,” it is forced to build the complete tree before it
can apply its theoretical tools since a strategy, according to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
definition, has to take care of all possible occurrences. The complexity of chess, therefore, lies
outside the theory itself and has to be tamed before the latter can display its prowess. For Shannon,
instead, the complexity is expressed in terms of the number of states—that is, chess positions—not
strategy, and this makes all the difference. States can be generated on the fly by the application of
the rules of chess, which form a small manageable set. A proficient (although not perfect) chess-
playing computer will be able to base its game on only a very small fragment of the complete
chess-game. The complexity of chess is now an integral part of the theory itself: it is the
“combinatorial explosion” in the number of states that a small number of rules can generate. Its
problem, therefore, becomes how to tame such a complexity by finding ways to keep the size of the
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tree under control.
By accepting most of the basic game-theoretic apparatus and, at the same time, relinquishing the
crucial concept of strategy, Shannon has provided a framework that makes chess’s complexity
thinkable. Moreover, his suggestions about how to tame such complexity will make the study of
chess relevant and will be crucial in establishing a strict connection between Artificial Intelligence
and chess. “This [e.g. finding moves that may not be best] is precisely what human players do: no
one plays a perfect game,” he says. Therefore, the “solution” of the game of chess might be found
in the human way of playing chess and, on the reverse, the performance of a chess-playing
computer may be measured against human performance.
This last point, however, is still a hint in Shannon’s paper and will not receive its full development
until the works of Simon and Newell. What, on the other hand, seems undoubtedly his, is the
“discovery” of the combinatorial explosion of states as the result of the dynamic application of the
rules. Although this may seem quite a discouraging result, in fact it plays a role analogous to the
breeder reactor’s properties we had seen at work in the Drosophila/genetics interaction. The
“complexity” of the insect lay in its ability to produce an ever increasing number of mutations when
interacting with the experimental methods of the geneticists. These mutations, by challenging the
scientists’ tools, were forcing them to refine their theories to keep up with the insect’s capacities.
Similarly, chess’s “ability” to turn out ever new forms of combinatorial explosions under the
scientists’ pressure to keep it under control forces them to devise more and more refined methods
(read, “theories”) to keep up with the game’s “complexity.” In both cases, the productive
relationship can be established because there is a conceptual framework that makes the object’s
complexity thinkable and that allows the search for a solution to start. In genetics’ case, this was the
theory of the gene, in Artificial Intelligence is the conception of a game as a search-space, e.g. as a
space of single, static positions generated recursively by the application of the rules of the game.
The framework provided by Shannon shifts all the emphasis in the study of chess from “solving the
game,” to “searching the space for an acceptable solution.” The problem of Artificial Intelligence
becomes how to search that space for a solution as good as a human being could find, providing
thus, in a single stroke, a theory of thinking and a theory of chess. It is the solution of this problem
that attracts the attention of Herbert Simon and Allen Newell.
Around 1950, Herbert Simon was a young economist working in the “backwaters” area of industrial
organizations and had already published a substantial work, Administrative Behavior. In the book, a
study of the way employees work in very large and generally public structures, he had argued that
real problem-solving decision cannot and do not happen by finding the optimal solution to a given
problem. In real-life situations, problem solvers (like managers) have to give up the hope to find the
best solution because they can count only upon limited information and do not have the best
possible strategies available to them. They can only rely on rules-of-thumbs, on heuristic rules
derived from past experiences to take decisions. The solutions they are looking for will be
“satisfactory” solutions that are “good enough” for the given, specific situation in which the
problem has to be solved and not optimal solutions valid in general. Simon called “satisficing,” as
opposed to “optimizing” this typical organizational behavior.39 This approach is very consonant
with most of game theory’s approach to economic behavior, in its insistence on seeing rationality as
always bounded by very effective constraints. Simon was in fact an early reader of von Neumann
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and Morgenstern’s work, and published a very positive review of the book, the very first one to
come out, in fact, in 1945.40 However, he was very critical of the concept of “solution” of a game, a
concept that he associated with the impossible search for an “objective” optimal rational behavior as
it could be judged from a third-person perspective. Instead, he insisted on satisficing as the best
expression of first-person, subjective rationality that would prove much more useful in the
comprehension of intelligent, decision-making behavior.41
Allen Newell’s work provided a different angle on the same issue: how to find an effective way to
tame the intrinsic complexity of the search space that has now become expressible. Newell, 10 years
Simon’s junior, had been a student of the mathematician George Polya while a physics
undergraduate at Stanford in the late 1940s, and had become well-acquainted with his work on
heuristics. Polya had diverted his attention from the then common study of the formal structures of
proofs as they are presented to the mathematical community (and as formal logic studies them), and
focused instead on the “solving methods” that bring the mathematician to the discovery of those
proofs. He had provided an articulate summary of heuristic methods that, although not guaranteeing
a solution, can provide the crucial insights that will lead to it.42 It is easy (it always is, post factum)
to see the convergence between Simon’s concerns and the basic premises of Polya’s studies that the
young Newell had absorbed.
After a year of graduate school at Princeton—where he met most of the leading game-theorists, but
that left him very dissatisfied with the purely mathematical approach to game theory that was
dominant in those years—Newell joined RAND to work on “applied” mathematics. There he met
Herbert Simon, who, although teaching in Pittsburgh, had been hired as a consultant and started to
spend a few summers there.43
In his autobiography, Simon notes that he got involved with RAND through the Cowles
commission and started to attend summer seminars in Santa Monica in 1952. The first product of
his interaction with the game-theorists was the article “A Behavioral Model Of Rational Choice,”
originally a RAND technical report. The paper contained an appendix on chess that was stimulated
by a talk on the topic given by von Neumann that summer. Simon writes: “I thought that von
Neumann was overestimating the difficulties substantially, and moreover I believed I had some
solutions for them which I proposed in the appendix [later excised from the public version].” He
later recalls that immediately after he met Newell, whom he recognized as being far more advanced
on the topic, he put his plans for a running chess-playing program on hold until they began
collaborate intensely on the project toward the end of 1955. Soon joined by Cliff Shaw, a system
programmer at RAND, they began working toward the implementation of a program incorporating
the profoundly different interpretation of game-theory we have just outlined. The report of their
effort was published in 1958 as “Chess-Playing Programs and the Problem of Complexity,” and
marks a landmark in the AI literature on chess. In fact, it marks a landmark in AI in general since,
by bringing to a conclusion the early phase of the interaction with games, it provides the guidelines
of a general theory about problems solving and its measurement through the application of
computer programs to chess that will remain stable for a long time to come.
At the beginning of their ground-breaking article, Simon, Newell and Shaw state clearly what is at
stake in the research: the program’s ability to play chess provides a measure of “recent progress in
understanding and mechanizing man’s intellectual attainments.”44 The argument supporting the
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claim is quite simple: “Chess is the intellectual game par excellence,” they say, and
Without a chance device to obscure the contest, it pits two intellects against each other
in a situation so complex that neither can hope to understand it completely, but
sufficiently amenable to analysis that each can hope to outthink his opponent. [...] If one
could devise a successful chess machine, one would seem to have penetrated the core of
human intellectual endeavor. (39, my emphasis)45
First of all, the scope of the project has substantially changed, veering off from applied mathematics
to, should we say, philosophy: the researchers’ aim is no longer, or not only, to discover useful
techniques to analyze complex situations, but rather to penetrate the “human intellectual core.” This
is possible because the emphasis has shifted from the general inquiry into rationality that was
specific to the original game-theoretic project to a more specific, and yet more ambitious, search for
the subjective roots of that rationality. In other words, Simon and Newell will strive to obtain a
description of the rational agent as it works, that is, a description of the process that brings
rationality about.
In this opening act, therefore, we see that the “core” of thinking, or the core of intellectual behavior,
is constituted by problem solving, and problem solving is well exemplified by taming the
complexity of a chess game. A theory of thinking must therefore provide not only a explanation of
how the goal, the solution, can be reached, but also a replication of the performance. Since the
solving process is what is at stake, the process itself will have to be replicated, not just the
underlying principle. The computer assumes then a central role, because it is only by simulating on
a computer the “blind” search of a solution abstractly possible in the game-tree that we can expect a
true confirmation of a theory.46
The second point to emphasize concerns the basic problem that such a theory must solve:
combinatorial explosion, or complexity, whose measure is given by the sheer, directly
unmanageable size of the game-tree. Newell, Simon, and Shaw’s answer to the problem proceeds
along two lines: first of all, we have better consider only a subset of all possible chess positions,
and more precisely only those which have a meaning for a normal chess game. This is where
“heuristics” and “satisficing” come into play. No exact, optimal rule for identifying this subset
exists, of course, but one can rely on the knowledge gathered by past chess experts and accumulated
in a small number of rules of thumb, or general strategic guidelines. In particular, the authors
compile a number of overall “goals” that a chess player must achieve, loosely speaking, in order to
win. For example, “keep the king safe,” “develop the pieces,” “do not block your own pawns,” etc.,
are goals of this kind. Only moves that contribute toward the satisfaction of the specified goals are
considered, thus greatly reducing the size of the search. In terms of the diagram, these rules amount
to a pruning of the tree along the horizontal axis. The second pruning strategy proceeds along the
other axis: instead of considering the whole game—which is, on the average, 80 levels deep—we
consider only the first four or five levels below the level at which the move is being played.
The effectiveness of these strategies, and especially their adequacy as a model of chess competence
in particular and thinking processes in general, can of course be seriously questioned. Indeed, they
have been questioned more than once.47 But my point is different. Heuristics adds the final touch to
the interaction between AI and chess that allows the closure of the feedback circle and triggers even
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/franchi.html[9/18/2009 5:07:54 PM]
more theoretical attention on the game. Heuristics is about chess (king’s safety, etc.), and it is about
reducing chess’s intrinsic complexity. Chess, as a consequence, is studied more and more as a space
to search on the basis of more and more sophisticated heuristic functions. This is what chess is for
AI, and will ever be. But not only: a whole, concrete view of games emerges, games as the closed
space that isolates it from anything outside and makes potentially meaningful whatever lies inside.
On the rebound, AI is precisely what comes out of this article, as I have already suggested above:
heuristic search in a search-space game-theoretically defined. “Thinking” must be explained in
terms of satisficing a set of rigid constraints by searching heuristically the space that those
constraints (i.e. rules) define. And the best way to provide and test a detailed theory of thinking is
by writing a computer program that will effectively search such a space.
5. Conclusion.
Seen from the inside, i.e. from the standpoint of its practitioners, AI is the discipline that can finally
provide a rigorous, scientific explanation of the most elusive phenomenon ever to confront scientific
progress: mind itself. A popular account of the field, for example, calls it “the mind’s new
science.”48 Under this common interpretation, AI is the theoretical effort striving to conquer the last
topic still unexplained by Western science and philosophy. Marvin Minsky, for example, called the
“AI problem one of the hardest science has ever undertaken.”49 (some “ultimate frontier” rhetoric is
far from absent in all popular and not so popular discussions of the topic). In this paper I have tried
to show that Artificial Intelligence’s scope cannot be contained within broad definition. Since the
very beginning, researchers like Herbert Simon, Allen Newell, and their followers were trying to
develop a general theory of human interaction centered on the activity of problem-solving as the
most conspicuous manifestation of human nature. This effort, in turn brought them to develop a
theory of games that, although built upon the central intuitions of classical game theory, pushed
them in a new direction and brought them to see most of mental life as a sophisticated game played
between the subject and the environment.
In concluding, I will say a few words on one important consequence of the interpretation suggested
here. AI’s ambitious research programme was bound to bring it in conflict with the discipline that
had tried for centuries to provide a satisfactory account of human nature: philosophy. Researchers
within the field of AI claim that their discipline is the “negation” of philosophy: they have
transformed the idle, “armchair” speculations of two thousands years of philosophy into a serious,
empirically-grounded scientific effort that will finally unveil the mysteries of the mind. The
opposition thus built rests on two claims: (a) that AI is a science in the traditional sense, and most
importantly, (b) that philosophy’s inquiry into the working of the mind are (or were) a hopelessly
misguided (because a-priori) scientific effort. In a nutshell, this interpretation identifies the object of
traditional philosophy (or most of what goes under this name) as a narrowly construed phenomenal
field, e.g. the “mind.” The field could perhaps have been empirically investigated, given the
appropriate intellectual and social conditions, in a proper scientific (e.g. “empirical”) way.
Unfortunately, either because of its basic theoretical leanings or because the times were not yet
mature for real science, philosophy decided to use the wrong methodological approach and resorted
to “armchair speculations” that doomed its efforts and kept the “mind” wrapped in a web of
mysteries for two thousand years. According to this interpretation, AI and philosophy come to have
the same content but a different form: they are (or were) both interested in providing a scientifically
reliable account of the mind, but where philosophy proceeds a priori AI proceeds scientifically on
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solid empirical grounds.
The interpretation sketched above, and the role played by games and game playing in the
construction of Artificial Intelligence’s theories suggests a different answer. Artificial Intelligence,
we said, can still be seen as a discipline that shares the content with philosophy but adds a different
form. The meaning of this claim varies with the scope of “content.” In the classical interpretation,
the basic assumption is that content of philosophy, say of Descartes, can be brought over to science
by a suitable change of methods because it is epistemologically equivalent to a scientific hypothesis
on a par with those used in the empirical sciences. However, if the subject matter of philosophy, its
content, is more properly understood, as truth in the broadest sense, then the meaning of the claim
that philosophy has the same content as AI changes radically because it forces us to reverse the
sense of the relationship between AI and philosophy.
Far from being a scientific reduction of raw ideas provided by philosophy, AI is an attempt, and
cannot be anything but the attempt to provide a metaphysics with non-philosophical means.
Artificial Intelligence is then a non-philosophy in the technical sense of determinate negation
suggested above: it stands in a determined opposition to philosophy because it receives from the
former the full scope of its inquiry, but it rejects the philosophical “tactics,” in Dennett’s words, i.e.
the a-priori investigations that have always characterized the philosophical demarche. Engineering
techniques, i.e. the implementation of computer programs, fill up the gap that is thus left open: they
are the right tools for the job, so to speak, since they allow AI to answer its questions synthetically,
instead of proceeding a-priori. Thus, the crucial relevance of engineering techniques within a
generally non-engineering context that I emphasized above, is explained. The production of artifacts
is only secondarily relevant to Artificial Intelligence, while the methodological reliance on synthetic
methods in service of “philosophical” goals is all that matters.50
Stefano Franchi
University Of Auckland
Notes
1. Artificial Intelligence’s birth date is usually taken to be 1956, when a summer school at
Dartmouth organized by John McCarthy and Claude Shannon gathered for a few weeks the
researchers who were working on the mechanization of intelligence: Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell,
Herbert Simon, Claude Shannon, John McCarthy, A. Samuel, etc. See John McCarthy, Marvin
Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester and Claude Shannon “A Proposal for the Dartmouth Research Project
on Artificial Intelligence,” available at URL:http://www-
formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth.html, and Pamela McCorduck, Machines Who Think
(San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979) 93-114. For reasons that will be apparent in
what follows, my genetic reconstruction will be focused on what happened in the decade that led to
the Dartmouth seminar.
2. On checkers see A. L. Samuel, “Some Studies on Machine Learning using the Game of
Checkers, The IBM Journal of Research and Development, 3, July 1959, 211-229, later in Edward
Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman, Computers and Thought (San Francisco: McGraw Hill, 1963) 71-
105. Interest in checkers has recently been revived by the exploits of a team based at the University
of Alberta, Canada, whose program, Chinook, is the first world Human-Machine champion (i.e. it
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won the title in a tournament open to both “human and non-human forms of intelligence”). The
literature on computer chess is immense. For a brief synopsis on the history of checkers playing
programs, see L. Stephen Coles, “Computer Chess: The Drosophila of AI,” AI Expert, 9, 4 (April
1994) 25-32. The first studies on chess-playing machines were by Turing and Shannon, who
provided the basic framework, later substantially enriched by Herbert Simon, who wrote the first
actually running program in 1955 (with Allen Newell, and Cliff Shaw), first at the Rand
Corporation and later at Carnegie Mellon; see Allen Newell, J.C Shaw, and Herbert Simon, “Chess-
Playing Programs and the Problem of Complexity,” The IBM Journal of Research and
Development, 2, October 1958, 320-335, also in E. Feigenbaum and Feldman Computers and
Thought... , 39-70. Computer chess has now become almost a sub-discipline of computer science,
with its specialized journal, conferences, etc., although it does not enjoy any longer the “exemplary
status” that was its own. For an early history of the development of machine chess see Allen Newell
and Herbert Simon, Human Problem Solving (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970) 663-707;
more recently, David E. Welsh, Computer Chess (Dubuque, Iowa: W.C. Brown Publishers, 1984);
for a recent assessment of the possible evolution of the field see Mikhail Donskoy and Jonathan
Schaeffer, “Perspectives on falling from grace,” T. Anthony Marsland and Jonathan Schaeffer, eds.,
Chess, Computers, and Cognition, (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1990), and Herbert Simon and
Jonathan Schaeffer, “The Game of Chess,” Handbook of Game-Theory with Economic Applications,
Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart, eds., (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1992) vol. 1, 1-
17. The Hanoi tower gathered attention only later: in 1958 Simon learned of its use in experimental
psychology and started to work on it, with Allen Newell, to test heuristic search capabilities of their
early programs. See Herbert Simon, Models of My Life (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
3. Alan Turing’s insights on computers playing chess and his hand simulation are presented in
Bertran Bowden, Faster than Thought, a Symposium on Digital Computing Machines (London:
Pitman, 1953) 288-295.
4. Herbert Simon, one of those most responsible for chess’s popularity, used the analogy widely
since the early 1960s, when AI’s interest in chess was still at its peak. He reports that he used it
routinely in the question and answer sessions after his talks, to defend the study of chess and other
games as a worthwhile research-project. See, for example, Herbert Simon, Models of My Life…,
327. In a private communication, Simon reported that he is not sure whether he or Allen Newell
actually coined the analogy. According to John McCarthy (personal communication), the analogy
itself might have been first proposed by Alexander Kronrod, then the head of the group that wrote
the Soviet chess program at the Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics in Moscow in
1965-68. Kronrod, however, might have gotten it from Herbert Simon, as McCarthy acknowledges.
A rather elaborate defense of chess as a research tool is contained in Allen Newell, J.C Shaw, and
Herbert Simon, “Chess-Playing Programs…” The metaphor is still actively used, in spite of chess’
smaller role in contemporary AI. Some researchers in AI have suggested that although the
theoretical impulse of chess within AI is all but exhausted, the game of go will soon become AI’s
new Drosophila.
5. Thus, AI provides the theory of games that game theory is not because its necessary focus on
actual game-playing behavior forced it to abandon from the start the assumption of optimal rational
behavior that is (or has been until very recently) a constitutive part of traditional game theory. I will
come back to a fuller discussion of this point in section 3 below.
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6. It will be enough to remember here J-F. Lyotard’s claim (in La condition postmoderne (Paris:
Seuil, 1979) 16) that a theory of games and agonistic behavior is what is needed in order to reach
an understanding of the postmodern condition; or the many remarks by the early Derrida (not only
in “L’écriture, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines,” but also in De la
Grammatologie and La pharmacie de Platon: “Jeu est la cyphre de l’ouverture anti-dialectique par
excellence”); Michel Foucalt’s essential reference to the “agonal character” of the interplay between
power and fredom (in Le sujet et le pouvoir), Heidegger’s remarks in Der Satz vom Grund, Lévi-
Strauss’s insistence on games throughout its work, etc.
7. See for example Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: the Construction of
Scientific Facts (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986);Joan Fujimura, Crafting Science (Cambridge:
Harvard UP, 1996); Joan Fujimura and Adele Clarke, eds., The Right Tools for the Job: At Work in
Twentieth Century Life Sciences (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992).
8. Robert Kohler, Lords of the Fly (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1994).
9. Kohler, for example, reports Morgan’s desperation when, after having reworked the Mendelian
formula for the third time in two years of intensive labor, yet another eye-color mutant popped up
unexpectedly. See Morgan and Bridges’ report quoted in Robert Kohler, Lords of the Fly…, 60-61.
10. Robert Kohler, Lords of the Fly 66.
11. Artificial Intelligence is often defined as the discipline aiming at the construction of artifacts
whose observable behavior, in some relevant domain, would be considered intelligent if performed
by a human being. If this were the case, then AI would just be a branch of engineering that does not
require any deep understanding of intelligence, nor of its (possibly psychological, possibly
physiological) processes underlying it. The additional assumption shared by several (but by no
means all) researchers in field, and by all the founding fathers, is that AI will succeed because its
artifacts will implement a more or less complete theory of human rationality. In other words, AI
artifacts will not just emulate intelligence, they will explain it. AI thus requires a definition of
“intelligence” and ‘intelligent behavior” and it is by no means obvious that playing chess is such a
perspicuous example of such a behavior that a theory of chess-playing would qualify as a theory of
intelligence. Recent developments in AI, in facts, have vigorously denied this last assumption: see,
for instance, the nouvelle AI perspective as presented in Rodney Brooks, Cambrian Intelligence
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999).
12. Suffice here to remember that Herbert Simon and Allen Newell began working on chess around
1952 at the RAND Corporation and traveled to the founding event of Artificial Intelligence, the
1956 Dartmouth summer seminar, well armed with ideas and first results. Claude Shannon, himself
one of the four organizers of the seminar, is responsible for the first introduction of chess into
computer science, although from a different perspective than Simon’s and Newell’s.
13. Roger Callois, Les jeux et les hommes (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), and Elliott Avedon and Brian
Sutton-Smith, The Study of Games (New York: J. Wiley, 1971) provide a broad overview of games
and play activities in general.
14. The history of game theory is actually richer, and it includes, at least, the contributions by the
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French mathematicians Emile Borel in the 1920s and 1930s. Borel provided the first clear definition
of pure and mixed strategies and proved the minimax theorem for some limiting cases. However, it
is John (then Johann) von Neumann who proved the general form of the theorem in 1928, while
still at Göttingen. Unfortunately, the historical literature on game theory is not that abundant. A
detailed reconstruction of a immediate context preceding and following the publication of von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s major work in 1944 is provided by Robert J Leonard in “Creating a
Context…,” 29-76. See also Johann von Neumann “Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele,”
Mathematische Annalen, 100 (1928), 295-320. See also Émile Borel, “La théorie du jeu et les
équations intégrales à noyau symétrique gauche,” Comptes Rendus de l’Académie des Sciences, 173
(1921) 1304-1308; “Sur les jeux où interviennent l’hasard et l’habilité des jouers,” Elements de la
théorie des probabilités, (Paris: Librairie Scientifique, 1924). For a discussion of Borel’s and von
Neumann’s different perspectives on games see Luca Dell’Aglio, “Divergences in the History of
Mathematics: Borel, von Neumann and the History of Game Theory,” Rivista di Storia della
Scienza 3.2 (1995) 1-45.
15. In fact, it has been argued that von Neumann and Morgenstern emphasis on strategy vs. Moves
in Theory of Games, and their shift away from minimax interpretation was precisely an attempt to
move away from the psychological dimension generating the “circularity of the ‘I think he thinks
that I think’ logic of strategically interdependent situations”; Andrew Schotter, “Oskar
Morgenstern’s Contribution to the Development of the Theory of Games,” Roy Weintraub (ed.),
Toward a History…, 106.
16. Ernest Zermelo “Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels,”
Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians, 1913, vol. 2, 510-504. Zermelo
was another mathematician of the Hilbert school, like von Neumann.
17. Robert Byrne, “Karpov Adjourns Play in a Drawish Endgame,” The New York Times, Tuesday,
July 9, 1996, B2.
18. Yasunari Kawabata, The Master of Go (New York: Knopf, 1972).
19. Alan Aycock, “Derrida/Fort-da: deconstructing play,” Postmodern Culture, 3, 2, January 1993,
contains one of the few anthropological analysis of chess that examines the concrete event of chess
playing and offers a very different perspective on rules perfect closure, etc. See alsoAlan Aycock,
“Finite Reason: A Construction of Desperate Play,” Play and Culture 5, 2, (1992)182-208 for
additional data on the multiplicity of chess scenarios (tournament play, Blitzkrieg games, etc.) and
the different conventions enforced by the players in the different occasions. More general critiques
of the conception of rule outlined above can be found in the present debate on Artificial
Intelligence, its ambitions and shortcomings. See for example H.M. Collins, Artificial Experts,
Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).
20. Note that this extremely static interpretation of the rules by von Neumann and Morgenstern is
often attributed to an excessive reliance of their theory on real games, whereas they should have
paid more attention, it is argued, to the economic behavior that the theory allegedly models. See,
for example, Philip Mirowsky “What Were von Neumann And Morgenstern Trying To
Accomplish?” Toward A History Of Game…, 141. In other words, “mere games” like chess have
fixed rules, whereas “real games” like war are subject to continuous negotiations. Instead, I think it
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will be progressively clearer that, if a criticism can be raised, is that they did not pay enough
attention to “mere games as they are actually played” as John McCarthy recently confirmed when
commenting upon Deep Blue’s defeat of Kasparov: “computer chess has developed much as
genetics might have if the geneticists had concentrated their efforts starting in 191o on breeding
racing Drosophila. We would have some science, but mainly we would have very fast fruit flies.”
See John McCarthy, “AI as Sport,” revue of Monty Newborn, Kasparov versus Deep Blue.
Computer Chess Comes of Age (New York: Springer Verlag, 1996), Science, 6/6/1997, emphasis in
the original.
21. The first game for which von Neumann and Morgenstern presents a a “normal” (i.e. matrix-like)
representation is actually “Matching pennies.” In this game, the two players agree that one will be
“even” and the other will be “odd.” Each one then shows a penny. They are shown simultaneously,
and each player may show either heads or tails. If both show the same side, then “even” wins the
penny from “odd;” if they show different sides, “odd” wins the penny from “even. Since this game
has only one move, the difference betwenn extensive (i.e. tree-like) and “normal (matrix-like)
representations is purely esthetical. In fact, it is a game in which the usual concept of strategy does
not apply, since each player has no planning to do. See John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern,
The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1944) 94, 111. Hereafter
referred to as TGEB.
22. The label “normal” is a clear enough indication of which representation von Neumann and
Morgenstern thought the correct one. Notice that current standard terminology in game theory has
abandoned this approach and prefers to talk of strategic games vs. extensive games, i.e. of games in
which “each player chooses his plan of action once and for all, and all players’ decisions are made
simultaneously” versus games that specify “the possible orders of events” (Martin Osborne and
Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994) 3. ) Recent work in
game theory has indeed questioned the assumption of perfect rationality that underlies the very
concept of strategy in a game represented in normal (or strategic) form. Kenneth Binmore goes as
far as to claim that serious progress in game theory has been hampered by the lack of serious
modeling of the players,. He then proceeds to recover Herbert Simon’s distinction between
substantial and procedural rationality (i.e. the distinction between “optimizing” and “satisficing” that
I will discuss below) in the context of contemporary game theory. Much game-theoretical work on
“bounded rationality” (another, and perhaps “the” Simonian concept) proceeds along similar lines.
See Kenneth Binmore, “Modeling Rational Players” I and II, Essays on the Foundations of Game
Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 199) 155-231; and the special 1994 issue on bounded
rationality of the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
However, even unorthodox game theorists like Binmore accept the idea that although optimal
rationality cannot be assumed, it will eventually be reached at the end of a learning process. See
Kenneth Binmore and Larry Samuelson, “An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms,”
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150, 1 (1994), 45-63, where the authors claim
that “although we deny that real people are natural gamesmen, it does not follow that we think that
the optimizing paradigm that has served economists so well should be abandoned. Experimental
work [by Binmore, ndr] shows that people can and do find their way to one of the equilibria of the
game by trial-and-error learning provided that:
- The problem they have to solve is not too complicated
- Adequate incentives are provided
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- They are allowed to play the same game many times (against a new opponent each time" (46).
Thus, the path toward a solution to the problem of bounded rationality is: learning will teach
common people to reach their game-theoretic equilibria. (Cf. the debate in early AI between search
and learning).
23. The more general form of the minimax theorem for two-person zero-sum games is essentially
what von Neumann proved in his 1928 paper. The result had already been shown to hold for chess,
(which is an instance of a class of games providing an additional constraint, i.e. perfect information)
by Ernst Zermelo, in 1913, in “Über eine Anwendung…” as reported above.
24. In fact, chess enjoys an almost paradoxical position in Game theory. Zermelo proved that it is
solvable in principle, i.e. he proved that there must be a strategy that guarantees at least a draw
either to black or to white. However, no one knows neither the value of this solution nor the
strategy in question. “Furthermore—as a game theorist stated— were the solution known, watching
a chess game would be about as interesting as watching paint dry: and nobody would play chess at
all if it were known to how to play it optimally.” But of course people do play chess, and they do
find it interesting. Conclusion? Game theory has basically nothing to say about chess, except
exploiting it as a typical example of a problem that it cannot solve. See Kenneth Binmore, Fun and
games: a text on game theory (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1992).50-51.
25. Or, to say it in game-theoretical jargon, “assign a value to each one of the terminal nodes and
then minimax your way back to the beginning.” See TGEB 143-165.
26. TGEB 125, my emphasis.
27. The two steps are in fact closely linked in TGEB, since the programmatic strategy is to treat a
n-person non-zero sum game as a n+1-person zero-sum game. This strategy has been questioned in
the following development of game theory. See for example TGEB, chp 11 and Andrew Schotter,
“Oskar Morgenstern’s contribution to the development of the theory of games,” in Roy Weintraub,
ed., Toward a History ....”.
28. The most well-known debate in the years immediately following the publication of TGEB is the
discovery, by Arnold Tucker, of the famous Prisoners’ dilemma, an example of a two-person,
incomplete information game with no equilibrium point that was bound to become one of the
paradigmatic “thought experiments” in game-theory. In spite of being formally called a “game,”
however, it is doubtful whether the Prisoners’ dilemma should be called a “game” in the common
sense of the word. See H. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. 2,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953) and the popular work by Richard Powers, Prisoner’s
Dilemma (New York: Beach Tree Books, 1988). A brief historical recollection on the invention of
the dilemma can be found in Howard Raiffa,” Game Theory at the University of Michigan, 1948-
1952,” Toward a History, Roy Weintraub, ed., 171-173.
29. Martin Shubik “Game Theory at Princeton, 1949-1955: A Personal Reminiscence,” Roy
Weintraub, ed., Toward a History of Game Theory, 152.
30. Roger A. McCain, “Lecture notes of a class in Economics and Game Theory,” URL:
http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/class/game-toc.html.
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31. Note that, in game-theory, this tends to be case still now. Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, for
example, are editing a monumental three-volume work, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic
Applications (New York: North Holland 1991-forthcoming) which opens with a chapter on chess
co-authored by Herbert Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer. The contribution is presented as follows:
“Historically, the first contribution to Game Theory was Zermelo’s 1913 paper on chess, so it is
fitting that the “overture” to the Handbook deals with this granddaddy of all games. The chapter
covers chess-playing computers. Though this is not mainstream game theory, the ability of modern
computers to beat some of the best human chess players in the world constitutes a remarkable
intellectual and technological achievement, which deserves to be recorded in this handbook.” (iv,
my emphasis).
32. See Philip Mirowski, “When Games Grow Deadly Serious…,” for a detailed analysis.
33. Most of the early attempt are discussed by Newell and Simon in Human Problem Solving, 671-
678. One of the first real programs to play chess was programmed at the Los Alamos labs in 1956.
See J. Kister, Peter Stein, Stan Ulam, W Walden, and M Wells, “Experiments in Chess,” Journal of
the ACM, 4 (1957) 174-177.
34. This may explain why neither Shannon nor Turing thought so important to actually write the
programs; also, it may explain why the crucial concept of heuristics rules, the technique that would
allow a dramatic improvement in the programs’ performances, was missing, in fact was the only
missing element, from Shannon’s design principle. Claude Shannon, “A Chess-Playing Machine,”
Scientific American, February, 182 (1950) 48 ff., later in James Newman ed., The World of
Mathematics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956) vol. 4; Claude Shannon, “Game-Playing
Machines,” Journal of the Franklin Institute, 260, 6 (1955) 447-453; Both essays are now available
in Claude Shannon, Collected Papers, N. J. A. Sloane and Aaron D. Wyner, eds. (New York, NY:
IEEE Press 1993).
35. On this issue see Alison Adam, “Constructions of Gender in the History of Artificial
Intelligence,” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, 18, 3 (1996) 47-53 and id. Artificial
knowing : gender and the thinking machine (New York : Routledge, 1997).
36. Claude Shannon, “A Chess-Playing Machine...,” 2132.
37. However, the problems (a) and (c) will prove very important in later development of AI. The
first one stands for the whole issue of knowledge representation, e.g. the problem of how to
translate the relevant information into an efficient set of data structures that a computer can
manipulate. The second problem, in turns, can be seen as pointing toward finding an adequate
computer language to express the program itself, an issue that has kept AI busy for many years to
come, from the development of IPL, the ancestor of list-processing languages that Simon, Newell,
and Shaw invented, to the development of LISP by John McCarthy. Thus, Shannon’s choice of the
search problem (i. e. (b)) as the most important one might seem to reduce Artificial Intelligence to
the problem solving activities that became the specific characteristics of the “Carnegie” school of
AI, i.e. the school led by Simon and Newell. But in fact, its choice makes clear the different
epistemological relevance of the problems at hand. Problem (b), searching in a state-space, is
conceptually prior to both (a), representation of the states, and (c), efficient processing, as Shannon
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immediately sees. It is precisely because searching turns out to be the problem, and a much harder
problem that early AI had thought, that expressive representation of knowledge and efficient
processing become important. Marvin Minsky, who, although close to Shannon in the years under
consideration, became known for his work on “frames,” e. g. a knowledge representation technique
conceptually belonging to problem (a), was very much aware of this fact. In an influential article
published in 1960, “Steps toward Artificial Intelligence,” Marvin Minsky argues that search is the
basic approach, sound but inefficient. The other fields of research are basically attempts to reduce
the massive inefficiency of thorough searches through either an appropriate reduction of the search
space (planning, learning) or an adequate improvement of the navigation through the search space
(pattern-recognition). See Marvin Minsky, “Steps toward Artificial Intelligence,” Edward
Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman (eds.), Computers and Thought (New York: MacGraw-Hill, 1963)
406-450. This essay had been circulating in draft form, as a technical report, since late 1956, e.g.
immediately after the Dartmouth seminar and was instrumental in providing a first organization of
the field. Minsky has repeated, and in fact broadened, his claim in Society of Mind where he calls
the possibility of space-searching the “puzzle-principle that is philosophically basic to AI since it
establishes the possibility of a creative machine insofar as it guarantees the existence of a solution
that the machine might find but the programmer does not know about. See Society of Minds, 73-74.
For a history of the development of LISP see Herbert Stoyan, “Early LISP History,” available at
URL: http://www8.informatik,uni-erlangen.de/html/lisp/histlit1.html, and Herbert Stoyan, LISP-
Anwendungsgebiete, Grundbegriffe, Geschichte, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag:,1980).
38. Shannon was actually pessimistic about the size of chess’s search space. Its size is now
generally taken to be of the order of O(1044). See Jonathan Schaeffer, Experiments in Search and
Knowledge, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Waterloo, 1986; Jonathan Schaeffer, One Jump Ahead
(New York: Springer Verlag, 1997); and Jonathan Schaeffer, Joseph Culberson, Noeman Treolar,
Brent Knight, Paul Lu and Duane Szafron, “Reviving the game of checkers” D.N.L. Levy and D.F.
Beal, eds., Heuristic Programming in Artificial Intelligence; The Second Computer Olympiad
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